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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the regulatory landscape of lucrative payday loans
has been a minefield. Payday loans are short-term, high-interest,
unsecured loans which mature on the borrower’s next payday or date
of income.1 In fees alone, consumers collectively spend as much as $9
billion on payday loans each year.2 In fact, “[p]ayday lending is a $46
billion industry in the U.S.,”3 with payday loans only making up one
part of the much larger “alternative financial services” sector,4
otherwise known as the “fringe banking” sector. In 2020, the two
federal agencies tasked with regulating federal and state-chartered
banks—the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)—issued three new
rules that impact the alternative financial services sector.5 These rules,
the so-called “valid-when-made” rules and “true lender” rule, were
intended to provide clarity regarding the enforceability of interest
rates on assigned loans that charge a rate permissible under federal
law, but forbidden by state usury statutes.6 The rules were meant to
*J.D. Candidate, 2023, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Wheaton College.
1
See What Is a Payday Loan?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Jan. 17, 2022),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-payday-loan-en-1567.
2
Jeanette N. Bennett, Fast Cash and Payday Loans, PAGE ONE ECON. (Econ. Rsch.
Fed. Rsrv. Bank St. Louis, St. Louis, Mo.), Apr. 2019, at 1, 2,
https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/page1-econ/2019/04/10/fast-cash-and
-payday-loans. The principles on these loans are generally $500 or less. Id. at 1.
3
Fighting the Debt Trap of Triple-Digit Interest Rate Payday Loans, PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan.
6, 2016, 8:59 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/fighting-the-debt-trap-oftriple-digit-interest-rate-payday-loans.
4
See Christine Bradley et al., Alternative Financial Services: A Primer, 3 FDIC Q., no.
1, 2009, at 39.
5
See infra Part IV.
6
See Philip Rosenstein, FDIC Board Approves Valid-When-Made Rule, Mirroring OCC,
LAW360 (June 25, 2020, 12:55 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1286685/fdicboard-approves-valid-when-made-rule-mirroring-occ; Al Barbarino, OCC Rule Aims to
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guarantee the applicability of federal preemption7 against state usury
law and, accordingly, bring legal certainty to transactions where stateby-state, court-by-court adjudications regarding the enforceability of a
loan’s interest rate threatened the fluidity and availability of credit.8
Since the early 2000s, instability in this sector has grown as courts have
found certain high-interest loans unenforceable based on (1) the
predominant economic interest test—also known as the true lender
test—which can result in a judicial determination that a loan’s “true
lender” is an entity other than the loan originator (i.e., one that cannot
take advantage of federal preemption), and (2) the Second Circuit’s
failure to utilize the “historic”9 “valid-when-made” doctrine in Madden
v. Midland Funding, holding that a loan’s enforceable interest rate at
origination does not always transfer to an assignee.10
The true lender test and a limited application of the valid-whenmade doctrine—what the new federal rules were meant to foreclose—
have permitted legislatures and courts to protect consumers against
predatory high-interest loans, including payday loans, installment
loans, and vehicle title loans. These forms of high-interest loans have

Settle Interest Rate Transfer Controversy, LAW360 (May 29, 2020, 9:12 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1278191/occ-rule-aims-to-settle-interest-ratetransfer-controversy; Jon Hill, OCC Adopts ‘True Lender’ Test for Bank Lending
Partnerships, LAW360 (Oct. 27, 2020, 9:33 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles
/1323367/occ-adopts-true-lender-test-for-bank-lending-partnerships.
7
The “Supremacy Clause” of the Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2) creates a
hierarchy in the enforceability of laws, and when there is a conflict between state law
and federal law, the federal law displaces the state law. See Preemption, LEGAL INFO.
INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preemption (last visited Jan. 13, 2022).
8
See Rosenstein, supra note 6; Hill, supra note 6; Barbarino, supra note 6. Former
Acting OCC Comptroller Brian P. Brooks stated that the Madden decision created
uncertainty regarding the valid-when-made doctrine and that secondary lending
markets depend on such certainty—i.e., the legal enforceability of a loan’s purported
interest rate—to work efficiently; to serve their essential role in the business of
banking; to help banks access liquidity; to improve financial performance ratios; and
to meet customer needs. Barbarino, supra note 6.
9
Jayne Munger, Note, Crossing State Lines: The Trojan Horse Invasion of Rent-a-Bank
and Rent-a-Tribe Schemes in Modern Usury Law, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 468, 488 (2019)
(highlighting that the popular understanding of the historic nature of the valid-whenmade doctrine can be traced to Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. 103 (1833), though, perhaps,
it should not be).
10
See DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, FEDERAL BANKING REGULATORS CAN AND
SHOULD RESOLVE MADDEN AND TRUE LENDER DEVELOPMENTS 2–5 (2018). For a specific
examination of the effects of Madden, see Colleen Honigsberg et al., How Does Legal
Enforceability Affect Consumer Lending? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 60 J.L. & ECON.
673, 709 (2017).
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proliferated since the 1970s via the growth of interstate lending,11
deregulation of the lending sector,12 and the expansion of the
“exportation doctrine,” which allows lenders to export the interest rate
caps (or lack thereof) from the state in which they are located.13
Where such loans would otherwise be usurious per state law, federal
preemption and the exportation doctrine have been used by lenders
in so-called “rent-a-bank” or “rent-a-charter” and “rent-a-tribe”
arrangements to avoid state consumer protections, enabling them to
charge exceedingly high interest rates.14 These lending arrangements
create feedback loops where consumers, disproportionately minority
and low-income,15 frequently take on additional loans (a practice
called “flipping”) to pay back prior loans, often spending more on fees
than the amount originally borrowed.16 High-interest loans are often
considered “debt traps,” and there are countless stories of the ills of
such borrowing.17 For instance, Arthur Jackson, a warehouse worker,
went to Advance America to borrow money and ended up paying an
estimated $5,000 in interest over five years for a loan with an original
principal of $200–$300.18 He was charged a triple-digit interest rate,
and the loan was flipped over one hundred times.19 Mr. Jackson had
to file for bankruptcy to save his home.20
After the OCC and FDIC released the true lender and valid-whenmade rules, a Democratic-majority Congress intervened in June 2021

11
See Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine
and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 547 (2004).
12
LAUREN K. SAUNDERS, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., WHY 36%? THE HISTORY, USE, AND
PURPOSE OF THE 36% INTEREST RATE CAP 2–3 (2013).
13
See Schiltz, supra note 11, at 522.
14
See Munger, supra note 9, at 473.
15
Id.
16
CFPB Finds Four Out of Five Payday Loans Are Rolled Over or Renewed, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us
/newsroom/cfpb-finds-four-out-of-five-payday-loans-are-rolled-over-or-renewed.
17
See, e.g., The Victims of Payday Lending, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
https://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/victims-payday (last visited Nov. 5, 2021);
Cardiff Garcia & Stacey Vanek Smith, Payday Loans and Debt Traps, NPR: PLANET MONEY
(Feb. 25, 2019, 4:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2019/02/25
/697873308/payday-loans-and-debt-traps.
18
The Victims of Payday Lending, supra note 17. Arthur Jackson is a pseudonym used
to protect the true borrower’s identity.
19
Id.
20
Id.
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through the Congressional Review Act to repeal the true lender rule,21
and several state attorneys general brought suits challenging the validwhen-made rules.22 Opponents to the rules argued that the new
regulations would lead to a further boom in abusive lending.23
In the background of this debate is the potential for a nationwide
consumer interest rate cap. In 2007 Congress passed the Military
Lending Act (MLA), which created a nationwide 36% annual interest
rate cap on consumer loans extended to active-duty military members
and their dependents.24 The Veterans and Consumers Fair Credit Act
(VCFCA), re-introduced in the Senate in 2021, proposes extending the
MLA protections to all consumers.25
This Comment discusses the history of high-interest consumer
lending in the United States, the impact of federal preemption on
traditional state-law-based consumer protections, state- and courtbased efforts to protect consumers, and the continued importance of
solidifying reasonable valid-when-made and true lender rules, even if
Congress were to pass the VCFCA. If the VCFCA—or a similar federal
consumer loan interest rate cap—were to be implemented, the need
for solidified valid-when-made and true lender rules becomes
especially acute. When income streams from high-interest loans shrink
to a significantly more-limited range, lenders will likely consolidate and
increase their reliance on rent-a-bank and rent-a-tribe arrangements to
make up for lost profit. One place to make up the income shortfall is
in previously overlooked jurisdictions where there is now a gap in
coverage between state-mandated caps and the higher federal ceiling.
Notably, with more limited profit ranges, lenders might also become
more aggressive in extending credit. Increased dependence on the

21

Biden Signs Law Overturning True Lender Rule, COOLEY LLP (July 2, 2021),
https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2021/2021-07-02-biden-signs-lawoverturning-true-lender-rule.
22
Jon Hill, FDIC Seeks to Quash State AGs’ Valid-When-Made Suit, LAW360 (May 21,
2021, 9:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1387176/fdic-seeks-to-quash-stateags-valid-when-made-suit.
23
Rosenstein, supra note 6; Press Release, Consumer Fed’n of Am., New Federal
Rule Will Embolden Predatory Lenders and Eviscerate State Interest Rate Caps (Oct.
27, 2020), https://consumerfed.org/press_release/new-federal-rule-will-emboldenpredatory-lenders-and-eviscerate-state-interest-rate-caps.
24
Nathalie Martin, Public Opinion and the Limits of State Law: The Case for a Federal
Usury Cap, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 259, 297–98 (2014).
25
Jon Hill, Senate Dems Push for Federal Consumer Loan Rate Cap, LAW360 (July 29,
2021, 7:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1407542/senate-dems-push-forfederal-consumer-loan-rate-cap.
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exportation doctrine and a host of riskier borrowers results in a dualfactor risk: increased default potential and a higher risk of
unenforceability—a danger that is potentially magnified if courts and
legislatures become more aggressive in their efforts to protect
consumers via expanding the application of the true lender test or
adopting a holding similar to Madden.26 Because of these risks,
especially regarding the legal enforceability of a loan, the lending
sector’s secondary markets would become increasingly wary, limiting
the fluid assignment of lending contracts. The uncertainty would
expose banks to increased risk on their balance sheets, potentially
effecting liquidity in the lending sector, which then effects the
availability of new consumer credit. This Comment argues that
solidified true lender and valid-when-made rules, coupled with a
nationwide interest rate cap, can facilitate greater stability in the
lending sector by (1) limiting the legal volatility of usurious highinterest consumer loans, and (2) curtailing the impetus for legislative
and judicial intervention to protect consumers by voiding usurious
loan contracts.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief history of high-interest
consumer lending in the United States and historic efforts to curtail
the practice. It details the relevance of the National Bank Act, explains
the genesis of the exportation doctrine in Marquette National Bank v.
First of Omaha Service Corporation, and sheds light on the conditions that
led to the significant increase in high-interest lending since 1978.
Part III provides specifics on how lenders use federal preemption
and the exportation doctrine in rent-a-bank and rent-a-tribe
arrangements to circumvent state-based interest rate limits. This Part
also details legislative and judicial responses to the explosion of highinterest lending, including the creation of the true lender test, and
discusses the potential implications of the Second Circuit’s
interpretation of Section 85 of the National Bank Act in Madden v.
Midland Funding.
Part IV chronicles the response of the OCC and FDIC to sector
instability caused by the true lender test and Madden, including the
issuance of the new true lender and valid-when-made rules in 2020. It

26
The failed attorneys general challenges to the OCC and FDIC’s valid-when-made
rules, discussed in Part IV, forecloses other jurisdictions’ adoption of a similar holding
as Madden. Nevertheless, given the diametrically opposed approaches of recent
presidential administrations regarding the rules, this Comment considers the
potential relevance of Madden if the rules, again, were to change.
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also highlights consumer advocates and lending industry
professionals’ reactions to the rules.
Part V discusses the history of the MLA, including its key terms
and its potential extension to all consumers via the VCFCA or a similar
bill, the potential impact of a nationwide cap on high-interest
consumer lending, and how lenders might exploit the gap between
state and federal interest rate limits. This Part argues that if a national
interest rate cap were implemented, solidified true lender and validwhen-made rules are necessary to stabilize the lending sector. Part VI
concludes by briefly summarizing why consistent valid-when-made and
true lender rules are important, even if Congress were to implement a
nationwide interest rate cap on consumer loans.27
II. HIGH-INTEREST CONSUMER LOANS—STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
This Part provides a brief overview of the history of high-interest
consumer lending in the United States, details the structure of the
federal regulatory scheme of banks, and sheds light on the relevant
judicial rulings and economic factors that facilitated the contemporary
growth of high-interest lending.
A. Brief History of High-Interest Consumer Lending
The United States has a long history of usury laws which limit
“high-interest” 28 lending.29 In 1641, approximately 148 years before
the signing of the U.S. Constitution, America adopted its first usury
limit in Massachusetts.30 Eventually all thirteen of the original states
adopted annual interest rate caps between 5% and 8%, which largely
remained in place until the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.31
27

Since the 2016 presidential election, the fast-changing, conflicting policies of
recent presidential administrations—coupled with the political majority changeover
in Congress—have created the fodder for the composition of this Comment. In this
landscape, it is difficult to access contemporary data, policies, and commentary related
to consumer lending that does not carry with it at least a tinge of politicization.
Accordingly, this Comment strives to acknowledge differing views and promote a
position that balances consumer protections with a stable, accessible lending sector.
28
What defines “high interest” is subjective, but potential considerations include:
the interest levels traditionally associated with a particular type of loan; the history of
lending in a particular field; moral standards and cultural values; and the statistical
ability of borrowers to successfully repay a loan on reasonable terms.
29
See Martin, supra note 24, at 263–65.
30
Id. at 263.
31
Id.
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In the late 1800s, following the industrialization of the United
States, an illegal black market developed for small loans as the
American economy shifted toward a “greater reliance on the purchase
of personal goods.”32 At the time, civil usury statutes in most states
limited chargeable interest rates to around 6%, which encouraged
legitimate lenders to focus on extending large amounts of credit to
businesses, rather than individual consumers.33 “Salary lenders,” a
historical antecedent to contemporary payday lenders, stepped in and
extended credit to consumers that would become due on the worker’s
next payday.34 Typical loans from a salary lender would carry four-digit
annual interest rates.35
Finding the lending practices abusive, social reformers, including
the Russell Sage Foundation, sought to end black market payday
lending and proposed a 36% annual interest rate cap for consumers.36
By creating an exception to the standard rate, the new cap was meant
to encourage legitimate lenders to enter the small dollar loan market.37
Arthur Ham, working with the Russell Sage Foundation, drafted a
model statute for states to implement that would permit lenders to
charge an annual interest rate of 24% to 42%.38 From 1914 to 1943,
thirty-four states adopted versions of the Uniform Small Loan Laws
proposed by the Foundation.39 During the late nineteenth century,
banking in the United States also grew increasingly complex and
created the conditions for contemporary use of federal preemption to
avoid state consumer protections.
In 1864 Congress passed the National Bank Act to establish a
national banking system.40 The legislation was intended to, inter alia,
create a national currency and “a national market for federal bonds to
finance the Civil War.”41 In large part, the success of national banks
depended on their ability to compete with state-charted banks and
other lenders.42 Accordingly, Section 85 of the Act afforded national
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

SAUNDERS, supra note 12, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Martin, supra note 24, at 264.
SAUNDERS, supra note 12, at 2.
Schiltz, supra note 11, at 544.
Id.
Id.
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banks a “national favorite” status, where the banks were allowed to
charge the maximum interest rate permissible by the state in which
they were located.43 Doing so prohibited state legislatures from
discriminating against nationally chartered banks via unequal
limitations on enforceable interest rates.44 With the passage of the
National Bank Act, the United States created a dual banking system
where national banks and state banks conducted lending activities
parallel to one another.45
Today, national and state-chartered banks continue to coexist and
are subject to complex regulation. State-chartered banks are primarily
regulated by states, and national banks by the federal government,46
but there is a significant amount of overlap in jurisdiction. For instance,
state-chartered banks are frequently subject to varied federal
regulations, such as the requirement to maintain deposit insurance.47
When state-chartered banks accept federal deposit insurance, the bank
becomes subject to many federal regulations, including those
promulgated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).48
The FDIC’s mission is to “maintain stability and public confidence in
the nation’s financial system.”49 Popularly known as the organization
that insures deposits in the United States, the FDIC also serves as the
primary federal regulator of state-chartered banks that are not part of
the federal reserve system.50 The FDIC is an independent agency and
is managed by a five-person board of directors, which includes the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Director of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau.51
Nationally chartered banks are primarily subject to federal law,
with their regulatory body including the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC).52 The OCC “ensures that the federal banking
system operates in a safe and sound manner,” supervising nearly 1,200
banking institutions whose business makes up 70% of the banking
43

Id. at 544–45.
Id. at 545.
45
See id. at 541.
46
Schiltz, supra note 11, at 541.
47
Id. at 541–42.
48
Id. at 542.
49
What We Do, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (May 15, 2020), https://www.fdic.gov
/about/what-we-do.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Schiltz, supra note 11, at 541.
44
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activity in the United States.53 The Comptroller of the Currency is the
chief executive officer of the OCC and also serves as a director of the
FDIC.54 The OCC charters and licenses national banks and “issues
rules and regulations that govern the banks it supervises.”55 Notably,
state law also plays an important role in regulating national banks. It
often provides the basis for the general contract, tort, and property law
of a jurisdiction in which a national bank is located.56 State law can
also control some national bank operations, such as the extent to
which a national bank may establish branches.57
Given the interconnected nature of the United States’ dual
banking system, OCC and FDIC consensus on regulatory issues is key
to stability in the lending sector, with a major goal being the
maintenance of competitive equality between the two types of banks.58
For instance, if a nationally chartered bank is given a competitive
advantage over a state-chartered bank via a change in regulation by the
OCC or a broader judicial interpretation of the banks’ lending powers,
the FDIC will adapt its policies to level the playing field.59 As illustrated
below, this dynamic has played itself out in the expansion of the
exportation doctrine and the release of the valid-when-made and true
lender rules.
B. Exportation Doctrine—Genesis and Expansion
In 1978 the Supreme Court dramatically expanded the
interpretation of Section 85 of the National Bank Act in Marquette
National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corporation, creating the
“[e]xportation [d]octrine.”60 In Marquette, the Court considered
whether a national bank based in Nebraska was able to charge some of
its customers—residents of Minnesota—an interest rate on credit card

53
Comptroller,
OFF.
OF
THE
COMPTROLLER
OF
THE
CURRENCY,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/who-we-are/comptroller/bio-michael-hsu.html
(last visited Sept. 10, 2022).
54
Id.
55
What We Do, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/index-what-we-do.html (last visited
Sept. 10, 2022).
56
Schiltz, supra note 11, at 543.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 565.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 546.
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transactions permissible in Nebraska, but usurious in Minnesota.61
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that it could, and the Supreme
Court affirmed.62
In the late 1970s, the First National Bank of Omaha (“First
National”) was a federally chartered national bank based out of
Omaha, Nebraska.63
First National was a member of the
BankAmericard plan (an early version of a contemporary credit card,
such as Visa) which allowed holders to purchase goods from
participating merchants or take cash advance withdrawals on credit.64
At the time, First National actively solicited citizens and merchants in
Minnesota to enroll and participate in the program.65 Per the terms of
the credit card and Nebraska state law, holders could be charged an
18% interest rate on their first $999.99 in debt, with the remainder
subject to a 12% interest rate.66
A competitor of First National, Marquette National Bank of
Minneapolis (“Marquette”), brought suit in Minnesota to enjoin the
bank from soliciting in Minnesota until its credit card terms complied
with Minnesota state usury law.67 Marquette claimed that First National
had an unfair advantage because it (a Minnesota-based bank) was
being “forced” to charge customers an annual $10 fee for its credit card
services, rather than charge a higher interest rate like First National.68
In response to Marquette’s request to subject First National to
Minnesota state usury law, First National claimed that Section 85 of the
National Bank Act preempted the state law.69 The Attorney General of
Minnesota—perhaps realizing that state consumer protections were at
risk—intervened and joined Marquette as a plaintiff, seeking a
declaratory judgment and permanent injunction.70
The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that Section 85
of the National Bank Act “plainly provides that a national bank may
charge interest ‘on any loan’ at the rate allowed by the laws of the
61

Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S.
299, 301–03 (1978).
62
Id. at 301.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 301–02.
65
Id. at 302.
66
Id.
67
Marquette, 439 U.S. at 304.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 306.
70
Id.
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[s]tate in which the bank is ‘located.’”71 The Court held that the
National Bank Act contemplated that a national bank would be
“located” in the state named in its organization certificate, and that
First National “cannot be deprived of this location merely because it is
extending credit to residents of a foreign [s]tate.”72 Marquette and the
Attorney General contended that when Section 85 of the National
Bank Act was written, the goal was to ensure that national banks could
maintain competitive equality with in-state lenders, and interpreting
Section 85 to cover out of state transactions would contravene the
intent of legislators.73 The Court disagreed.74 Citing the long history
of the vast and complex interconnectedness of the United States
economy and other sections of the National Bank Act that contemplate
interstate lending, the Court determined that legislators knew that
national banks would be given distinct advantages, including the ability
to export their interest rates.75 In response to the claimant’s argument
that such an interpretation of Section 85 would “significantly impair
the ability of [s]tates to enact effective usury laws,” the Court stated
that any “plea to alter [Section] 85 . . . is better addressed to the
wisdom of Congress than to the judgment of this Court.”76
Thus, the holding of Marquette is the genesis of what is
contemporarily called the “exportation doctrine.”77 Notably, Marquette
was decided in “the infancy” of interstate lending and technological
developments since the late 1970s have allowed national banks to have
a physical presence and orchestrate lending arrangements far from
where they were originally chartered.78 Moreover, since 1978, national
banks’ ability to export interest rates has extended far beyond the
scenarios contemplated in Marquette, where national banks can now
have branches in states in which they are not “located,” national banks
can be “located” in their home state or a favorable host state, and
national banks are not necessarily “located” in a state where they have
a substantial physical presence.79

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 308.
Id. at 310.
Marquette, 439 U.S. at 313.
Id. at 314.
See id. at 314–18.
Id. at 318–19.
Munger, supra note 9, at 496.
See Schiltz, supra note 11, at 547.
See id. at 555–56.
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Importantly, the exportation doctrine has not been limited to
credit card arrangements—it has broad applicability across the lending
sector, including high-interest consumer loans such as payday loans,
car title loans, and installment loans.80 Over time, the exportation
doctrine also became applicable to federally insured state-chartered
banks because of the inequities the doctrine brought to the dual
banking system.81
C. Race to the Bottom
Following Marquette and the subsequent technological and
regulatory developments that facilitated interstate banking, the United
States experienced a “race to the bottom” for consumer protection
laws. As one commentor framed it, “[Marquette’s holding] was like a
gunshot starting a frenzied race-to-the-bottom in American usury
law.”82 National banks that wished to use the exportation doctrine to
charge consumers a higher interest rate—gaining a competitive
advantage against fellow lenders—simply had to find a state willing to
permit higher interest rates and “locate” themselves there. Looking to
attract “lucrative financial service jobs,” states such as Delaware and
South Dakota eliminated their usury statutes.83 To remain competitive,
other states were forced to limit their usury laws or risk losing their
banking industry.84 The race to attract financial sector jobs by
eliminating consumer lending interest rate caps, coupled with intense
levels of inflation during the period, “squeezed the availability of
credit” and spurred further deregulation.85
A state-by-state analysis regarding the permissibility of highinterest consumer loans is beyond the scope of this Comment, but
80
See SAUNDERS, supra note 12, at 4 (highlighting that nationwide interest rate
regulations implemented by the Department of Defense included payday loans, car
title loans, and refund anticipation loans); Munger, supra note 9, at 472 n.16 (listing
the various types of lending considered part of the “alternative financial services . . .
industry” or “fringe banking[] industry”).
81
See Schiltz, supra note 11, at 565, 567–68.
82
Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand:
Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1121 (2008).
83
Id. at 1122.
84
SAUNDERS, supra note 12, at 2.
85
Id. at 3. For additional insight on the market dynamics that led banks to relocate
to jurisdictions like Delaware see Claire Tsosie, Why So Many Credit Cards Are from
Delaware, FORBES (Apr. 14, 2017, 5:46 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/clairetsosie/2017/04/14/why-so-many-credit-cards-are-from-delaware
/?sh=4387f5d61119.

2022]

COMMENT

581

sufficient data is available for common closed-end loans to give a brief
flavor of current usury statutes across the United States. As of July
2021, Delaware and Missouri have no usury limits on $500 six-month
loans; Idaho, Utah, and Wisconsin only prohibit interest rates that
would make the contracts unconscionable.86 With permissible annual
interest rates from 39% to 305%, twenty-three states allow for $500 sixmonth loans above the 38.5% interest rate median.87 For $2,000 twoyear loans, Delaware, Missouri, and North Dakota have no interest rate
cap,88 and Alabama, Idaho, South Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin have
no limitation other than contractual unconscionability.89 Above the
median interest rate of 32%, nineteen states allow for annual interest
rates ranging from 33% to 175%.90
These figures are a far cry from the typical 6% cap allowed during
the colonial era or the 24% to 42% carve outs advocated for by
reformers trying to facilitate legitimate banks’ entry into the small
dollar market.91 Based on these statistics, banks that can take
advantage of federal preemption have a sufficient number of states
that are willing to offer no, or only negligible, interest rate limits.
Notably, Delaware and South Dakota, two of the states that
eliminated their usury laws after Marquette, have recently followed
divergent paths regarding state interest rate caps. Today, Delaware still
has few limits on closed-end consumer loans,92 but South Dakota
changed course in 2016 with approximately 76 percent of voters
enacting ballot Measure 21 to implement a 36% interest rate cap on
short-term loans.93 The measure:
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NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., STATE RATE CAPS FOR $500 AND $2,000 LOANS (2021)
[hereinafter STATE RATE CAPS].
For an in-depth discussion regarding the
shortcomings of the contractual unconscionability doctrine in protecting consumers
from high interest loans, see Martin, supra note 24, at 283–92.
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STATE RATE CAPS, supra note 86.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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See supra text accompanying notes 31–39.
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See Munger, supra note 9, at 476 (discussing states that do not have usury limits);
see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 2227–2238 (2021) (requiring lenders to disclose
additional information to borrowers of short-term consumer loans, but not
implementing a state-mandated interest rate limit).
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South Dakota Payday Lending Initiative, Initiated Measure 21 (2016), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/South_Dakota_Payday_Lending_Initiative,_Initiated
_Measure_21_(2016) (last visited Sept. 10, 2022).
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[P]rohibits all State-licensed money lenders licensed under
South Dakota Codified Laws . . . from making a loan that imposes total interest, fees, and charges (including all charges
for any ancillary product or service and any other charge or
fee incident to the extension of credit) at an annual percentage rate greater than 36%.94
The lenders subject to the law “make commercial and personal loans,
including installment, automobile, short-term consumer, [payday]
and title loans” and are prohibited from “evading the rate limitation
by indirect means.”95 It is important to note that the initiated measure
“does not apply to state and national banks, bank holding companies,
other federally insured financial institutions and state chartered trust
companies.”96 That is, despite the will of voters in South Dakota to
protect consumers from high-interest loans, federal preemption
remains a hurdle for the enforceability of state usury laws because the
new ballot initiative does not touch the enforceability of high-interest
rates for loans originated via rent-a-bank or rent-a-tribe arrangements.
Against this backdrop, state legislatures and courts began to
challenge the enforceability of high interest rates associated with
consumer loans.
III. CHALLENGING HIGH-INTEREST CONSUMER LOANS
After expansion of the exportation doctrine and the race to the
bottom for the deregulation of consumer loan interest rates,
legislatures and courts began to realize and address the ills of highinterest consumer lending that utilizes federal preemption to avoid
state consumer protections. By identifying the “true lenders” of highinterest consumer loans as non-bank entities, and limiting the validwhen-made doctrine, courts have voided lending arrangements or
limited chargeable interest rates. This Part outlines the creation and
impact of the true lender test and the implications of a limited
interpretation of the valid-when-made doctrine.

94
Guidance for Money Lenders on Initiated Measure 21, S.D. DEP’T OF LAB. & REGUL.,
https://dlr.sd.gov/banking/money_lenders/guidance_initiated_measure_21.aspx
(last visited Sept. 10, 2022).
95
Press Release, S.D. Dep’t of Lab. & Regul., Initiated Measure 21 Approved (Nov.
10, 2016), https://dlr.sd.gov/news/releases16/nr111016_initiated_measure_21.pdf.
96
Id.
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A. Predominant Economic Interest and “True Lenders”
One method to attack the enforceability of a loan that would be
usurious, but for federal preemption, is for a state to implement a
“predominant economic interest” or “true lender” test. This test allows
courts to “pierce the veil” of arrangements made between entities that
can take advantage of federal preemption with those that cannot,
determining that the non-bank entity was the true lender, and apply
state usury law.97
1. Development of the Test
The true lender test emerged out of state legislative action, with
the first example being a 2004 Georgia bill aimed at targeting rent-abank schemes.98 The bill stated, “[a] purported agent shall be
considered a de facto lender if the entire circumstances of the
transaction show that the purported agent holds, acquires, or
maintains a predominant economic interest in the revenues generated
by the loan.”99 The first case brought by lenders challenging the
legislation was Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker.100 The Eleventh Circuit originally
upheld the district court’s refusal to find federal preemption,101
holding there was no conflict with the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
when the Georgia law only restricted in-state payday lenders from
entering into agency relationships with out-of-state lenders when the
in-state lender retained the predominant economic interest in the
loan.102 The challenge to the law later became moot because changing
FDIC regulations further constrained the specific type of payday
lending that was taking place in Georgia, and the lenders’ plans to
retool their business models to comply with the federal regulations,
while remaining non-compliant with the Georgia law, were too
speculative to be justiciable.103
Following Georgia, other states have enacted similar laws. For
instance, New Mexico enacted a true lender law in 2007, but it was later
repealed in 2018.104 More recently, the Illinois legislature passed the
97
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Predatory Loan Prevention Act where an entity is a lender subject to
state law if it “(i) purports to act as an agent or service provider for
another entity that is exempt from the [Act], and, among other
requirements, (ii) ‘holds, acquires, or maintains, directly or indirectly,
the predominant economic interest in the loan.’”105 Maine recently
passed the Protect Consumers Against Predatory Lending Practices Act
which details that an entity is a lender subject to state usury law when
it: “holds, acquires, or maintains, directly or indirectly, the
predominant economic interest in the loan,” when it “markets,
brokers, arranges, or facilitates the loans or holds the right,
requirement, or first right of refusal to purchase the loan or a
receivable or interest in the loan,” or when “the totality of the
circumstances indicate that the person is the lender and the
transaction is structured to evade the requirements of the [Maine
Consumer Credit Code], including the licensing requirement.”106
2. Case Law Examples
The case law detailed below demonstrates how the true lender test
is applied in practice and how lenders are flexible in adapting their
arrangements to avoid the enforceability of state consumer
protections. In particular, the cases focus on CashCall, Inc. and the
company’s use of federal preemption both via a FDIC-insured rent-abank scheme and a rent-a-tribe scheme to extend unsecured consumer
loans. Readers should not lose track of the forest for the trees: at the
core of these arrangements is a borrower seeking a loan which the
lender is willing to extend in exchange for a high interest rate and,
depending on the circumstances, additional collateral such as a vehicle
title.107
i. Rent-a-Bank Arrangement
In CashCall, Inc. v. Morrisey, the West Virginia Supreme Court
upheld a lower court’s application of the predominant economic
interest test for a series of consumer loans facilitated by CashCall,
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Fintech Focus: A “Predominant Economic Interest” . . . in Illinois and Maine, MORRISON
FOERSTER (Aug. 27, 2021), https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/210827fintech-focus-predominant-economic-interest.html.
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Id.
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For additional information on car title loans, a common form of high-interest
lending, see What to Know About Payday and Car Title Loans, FED. TRADE COMM’N.
CONSUMER ADVICE. (May 2021), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/what-knowabout-payday-and-car-title-loans.
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Inc.108 At issue were loans issued between August 2006 and February
2007 to 292 citizens of West Virginia.109 Via CashCall, borrowers would
request a loan, the state-chartered First Bank and Trust of Millbank
South Dakota (“FB&T”) would originate the loan, and CashCall would
buy the loan from FB&T shortly after origination.110 The loans ranged
from $1,075 to $5,000 with annual interest rates of 59% to 96%.111
Eventually, 212 of the 292 borrowers defaulted.112 When suit was
brought against CashCall for failure to abide by West Virginia usury
law, the company claimed that the loans were exempt under FB&T’s
right to federal preemption.113
In deciding against CashCall, the court based its reasoning on a
1974 West Virginia case that stated that the state’s usury statute:
[C]ontemplates that a search for usury shall not stop at the
mere form of the bargains and contracts . . . but that all shifts
and devices intended to cover a usurious loan or forbearance
shall be pushed aside, and the transaction shall be dealt with
as usurious if it be such in fact.114
The court also considered a handful of cases in which other federal
and state courts previously applied the predominant economic interest
test in rent-a-bank cases.115
In prioritizing function over form, the court noted several facts
that led to its conclusion that CashCall, not FB&T, was the true lender:
(1) “FB&T placed the entire monetary burden and risk of the loan
program on CashCall,”116 (2) CashCall’s President and CEO Paul
Reddman was required to personally guarantee each loan extended by
FB&T under their arrangement, (3) CashCall paid more to the bank
than the value of the loans originated, and (4) CashCall had to
indemnify the bank against all losses, including claims from
borrowers.117
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Soon after CashCall’s loss in West Virginia, the lending model of
CashCall using FDIC-insured banks became unworkable when statechartered banks, under pressure from the FDIC, withdrew from their
arrangements with the company.118
ii. Rent-a-Tribe Arrangement
CashCall, searching for a new lending model, entered into an
arrangement with Western Sky Financial (Western Sky), a South
Dakota limited liability corporation formed by Martin Webb, a
member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.119 The goal of the
arrangement was to use, in their words, the “tribal model” to escape
state-law-based consumer protections.120 Rent-a-tribe arrangements, or
here, the tribal model, are based on federal laws that grant certain
Native American tribes sovereign immunity against state laws and
regulations.121 This means that loans issued under tribal law can be
shielded from state-law-based interest rate caps via, again, the
exportation doctrine and federal preemption.
In the arrangement between CashCall and Western Sky, CashCall
extended the original funds to Western Sky, which Western Sky would
then lend to borrowers after CashCall connected consumers with the
company; CashCall would then purchase “each and every loan” from
Western Sky before borrowers made any payments.122 Some of the
loans included triple-digit annual interest rates ranging from 134.4%
to 318.52%.123 CashCall also fully indemnified Western Sky against any
consumer and regulatory suits.124
After the Consumer Protection Financial Bureau brought suit on
behalf of the impacted borrowers, the court determined that the loans
were void via the predominant economic interest test because
CashCall, not Western Sky, was the true lender of the loans.125 The
holding was based on the finding that the “entire monetary burden
and risk of the loan program was placed on CashCall.”126 In short, the
118
CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., CV 15-7522 (RAOx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130584, at
*4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016).
119
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Munger, supra note 9, at 477.
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court determined “whether an animal which looks like a duck, walks
like a duck, and quacks like a duck, is in fact a duck.”127 The case was
a win for consumers, but in the aggregate, such inquiries are believed
by industry professionals to have a problematic effect on liquidity in
the lending sector.
3. Protection of Consumers & Creation of Sector Instability
Although state legislatures and courts have been able to front the
interests of consumers using the predominant economic interest test
to identify non-bank entities as true lenders, doing so creates instability
in the sector because of the state-by-state, court-by-court application of
the rule.128 In each case, the application of the rule requires a factintensive inquiry for each loan to determine if the loan’s interest rate
is enforceable.129 A case-by-case determination if a loan is enforceable
is unwieldy where the lending sector depends on the fluid purchase
and sale of loans. That is, the true lender rule “increase[s] legal and
business risks to potential purchasers of bank loans, which in turn may
reduce overall liquidity in loan markets, limiting the ability of banks to
sell loans to manage balance sheet risk.”130
Accordingly, lenders spurred the OCC to propose the new “true
lender rule.” With this rule, the OCC attempted to “address the
‘increasing uncertainty’ in the legal framework that governs lending
partnerships between banks or federal savings associations and third
parties” and to clarify “what legal framework applies, when the loan is
originated as part of a lending relationship between a bank and third
party.”131 As detailed below, limiting the valid-when-made doctrine
raises similar issues as the true lender test, which the OCC and FDIC
tried to address with a corresponding rule.

127

Id. at *17.
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B. Valid-When-Made Doctrine
Another method of attacking what would be a usurious loan but
for federal preemption is to limit the scope of the long-standing “validwhen-made” doctrine. One purported genesis of the doctrine is the
1833 Supreme Court case Nichols v. Fearson, where the Court stated that
“a contract, which, in its inception, is unaffected by usury . . . can never
be invalidated by any subsequent usurious transaction.”132 When
discussing the valid-when-made doctrine, Judge Posner later explained
“once assignors were authorized to charge interest, the common law
kicked in and gave the assignees the same right, because the common
law puts the assignee in the assignor’s shoes, whatever the shoe size.”133
There is significant contemporary debate regarding the validity of the
historic nature of the valid-when-made doctrine and its popular
understanding.134 Critics argue that Nichols and its progeny do not
provide any historical basis for the doctrine because the cases concern
completely different lending transactions that are factually
distinguishable from contemporary instances of rent-a-bank and renta-tribe schemes,135 while supporters argue that the popular
understanding of the common law rule (like Judge Posner’s) is correct
and key to the smooth functioning of the lending sector.136 This
Comment is not focused on arguing the validity of the valid-whenmade doctrine. Rather, it is focused on the doctrine as it is currently
understood and implemented by the OCC and FDIC in crafting rules
in response to Madden v. Midland Funding.137 Although Madden did not
explicitly discuss the rent-a-bank schemes that have proliferated in the
payday lending sector, or business dealings that endeavor to use tribal
sovereignty to avoid state usury law, “its reasoning potentially applies
to those arrangements.”138 Thus, the scope of the valid-when-made
doctrine as codified by OCC and FDIC will be key in determining if
lenders can continue to use federal preemption to avoid state usury
laws, even if a federal interest rate cap were to be implemented.
Subsequently, a brief overview of the Second Circuit’s Madden v.
Midland Funding is warranted.
132

Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. 103, 109 (1833).
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1. Understanding Madden
In Madden v. Midland Funding, Saliha Madden, a resident of New
York, obtained a Bank of America credit card.139 Madden’s credit card
was later consolidated with another national bank, FIA Card
Services.140 Madden owed approximately $5,000 on her credit card
when FIA “charged-off” her debt, assigning it to Midland Funding
LLC.141
Midland Funding and its subsidiary, Midland Credit
Management, Inc., (the defendants in the case) were not national
banks, and after assignment, neither Bank of America nor FIA Card
Services had any interest in Madden’s debt.142 In 2010, Midland sent
Madden a notification stating that her debt was subject to a 27%
annual percentage rate, and a year later, Madden filed a class action
suit alleging, inter alia, that the 27% interest rate violated New York
state law.143
The trial court stated that Madden’s suit was essentially dead on
arrival: “the [National Bank Act] would preempt any state-law usury
claim against the defendants.”144 The Second Circuit reversed and
vacated the trial court’s judgement, stating that
[b]ecause neither defendant is a national bank nor a subsidiary or agent of a national bank, or is otherwise acting on behalf
of a national bank, and because application of the state law
on which Madden’s claims rely would not significantly interfere
with any national bank’s ability to exercise its powers under the
NBA, we reverse the District Court’s holding that the NBA
preempts Madden’s claims . . . .145
On petition, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
A key critique of Madden is that the court “failed to acknowledge
or address the [valid-when-made] doctrine” and instead relied on
Barnett Bank N.A. v. Nelson where the “Supreme Court held that the
National Bank Act preempts state law only if the application of state
law ‘significantly interferes’ with a national bank’s exercise of its
powers.”146 The court in Madden did not think that the application of
state usury laws to loans originated at national banks, but later assigned
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
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to non-national bank entities, and the subsequent inability of nonnational banks to charge what would otherwise be usurious interest
rates, would “prevent consumer debt sales by national banks to third
parties.”147 And that “[a]lthough it is possible that usury laws might
decrease the amount a national bank could charge for its consumer
debt in certain states (i.e., those with firm usury limits, like New York),
such an effect would not ‘significantly interfere’ with the exercise of a
national bank power.”148
2. The Implications of Madden
If extended to other jurisdictions outside of the influential
Second Circuit, Madden potentially guts the viability of rent-a-bank or
rent-a-charter schemes in those jurisdictions,149 but it also raises larger
questions regarding the continued enforceability of a loan’s original
interest rate after assignment. Some critics of the holding have said
that Madden “threaten[s] to interfere with the core powers afforded to
banks under federal law and undermine the smooth functioning of
our financial system,”150 even though it is squarely admitted that the
decision and other “true lender developments likely reflect efforts by
courts and state legislatures to address important consumer protection
concerns arising from extreme and abusive conduct in payday
lending.”151 Former Comptroller Otting, who served during the
Trump administration, emphasized the importance of national banks’
ability to dependably originate and assign loans in order to “create
capacity in the marketplace for originators” and expand consumer
choice, 152 a position supported by the lending industry.153 In fact,
Republicans in Congress introduced two bills in 2017 to address the
instability resulting from Madden, both seeking to enforce the validwhen-made doctrine in all cases;154 neither bill passed.155 As evidenced
by the hotly-contested rule changes detailed below, holdings like
147
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Madden remain an outstanding issue for the lending industry,
especially if the current rule were to change. Consistent, solidified
agency guidance is needed to promote stability in the sector.
IV. SEEKING CLARITY AND NOT FINDING IT: TRUE LENDER AND VALIDWHEN-MADE RULES
In light of the expansion of the true lender test, Madden, failed
congressional proposals to codify the valid-when-made doctrine, and
the continued sector instability regarding the assignability of interest
rates for loans originated at FDIC-insured or national banks, the OCC
and FDIC drafted and implemented the three rules discussed below.
Although the rules—as written—are either repealed or tenuously in
place, clarity on the issues that led to their creation, i.e., legal certainty
regarding the enforceability of a loan’s interest rate after assignment
remains necessary, especially if a national interest rate cap were to be
implemented and use of rent-a-bank or rent-a-tribe arrangements were
to expand.
A. Valid-When-Made Rule
To address the uncertainty posed by Madden, the OCC and the
FDIC issued two separate, but similar valid-when-made rules in 2020.156
The OCC rule, issued in May 2020, states that “when any national or
savings bank ‘sells, assigns, or otherwise transfers a loan, interest
permissible before the transfer continues to be permissible after the
transfer.’”157 The FDIC rule, issued in June 2020 “clarif[ied] that loans
originated by state-chartered banks remain valid throughout the
lifetime of the loan.”158
Both rules mirror what was called for by critics of the Madden
holding: “the federal banking regulators should issue clarifying
regulations, which look to existing guidance issued by federal banking
regulators and are informed by the long-standing principles of the
Those
valid-when-made doctrine as articulated by courts.”159
advocating for consumer protections saw the new rules as a “boon to
predatory lenders seeking to skirt state interest rate caps . . . .”160 That
is, by seeking to create a bright line rule to assuage assignee concerns
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regarding the enforceability of interest rates applicable at
origination—greasing the skids of the secondary lending market—the
OCC and FDIC facilitated the future growth of rent-a-bank and rent-atribe arrangements.
Although enactment of a nationwide 36% consumer loan interest
rate cap would likely temper debate over the potentially exploitative
effects of the valid-when-made rules, a final, consistently accepted rule
remains necessary for clarity in secondary markets where lenders can
exploit the gap between the federal limit and lower state usury statutes.
In turn, it is valuable to outline (1) the scope, reasoning, and history
of the extant rules; (2) critiques and challenges to the rules; and (3)
recent developments that reflect the shift in presidential
administrations.
1. The OCC’s Valid-When-Made Rule
In November 2019, during the Trump administration, “the OCC
published a notice of proposed rulemaking . . . to codify its conclusion
that when a national bank or savings association (bank) sells, assigns,
or otherwise transfers . . . a loan, interest permissible before the
transfer continues to be permissible after the transfer.”161 The OCC
acknowledged that “recent developments [i.e., Madden] have created
legal uncertainty about the ongoing permissibility of the interest term
after a bank transfers a loan.”162 The new rule was designed to narrowly
address this source of uncertainty.163 In particular, the OCC stated that
the proposed rule is based on the belief that “unresolved legal
uncertainty” regarding the developments may disrupt banks’ ability to
serve customers and businesses, particularly in times of economic
stress, and that “enhanced legal certainty may facilitate responsible
lending by banks.”164
In issuing the rule, the OCC reasoned that the National Bank
Act’s grant of authority to national banks to enter into contracts
“necessarily includes the authority to assign such contracts.”165 And
that the “conspicuous” silence of Section 85 of the National Bank Act
regarding the assignability of interest rates originated at national banks
161
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lends credence to the bureau’s ability “to interpret . . . and resolve this
silence.”166 The OCC believed its new rule was a reasonable
interpretation of Section 85, within the “tenets of common law,” and
consistent with the purpose of Section 85.167
In making its decision to implement the rule, the OCC readily
acknowledged that the impact of Madden is dependent on the specific
business models of individual national banks—i.e., the assignment of
what would otherwise be usurious loans to non-banks—but that
Madden’s “resulting legal uncertainty impairs many national banks’
ability to rely on [assignment as a] risk management tool, which is
particularly worrisome in times of economic stress when funding and
liquidity challenges may be acute.”168 The OCC also said the foregoing
reasoning applied equally to savings associations and that “section
1463(g) should be interpreted coextensively with section 85.”169 In
totality, “the OCC conclude[d] that, as a matter of Federal law, banks
may transfer their loans without impacting the permissibility or
enforceability of the interest term.”170
In responding to critiques that the new rule would “facilitate
predatory lending” by promoting rent-a-bank arrangements,171 the
OCC stated—in this author’s opinion, disingenuously—that
“[n]othing in this rulemaking in any way alters the OCC’s [strong
opposition to predatory lending],” and that the agency “has issued
guidance on how banks can appropriately manage the risks associated
with these relationships.”172 The OCC emphasized that the new rule
was aligned with recognizing state law interest rate caps and that
“disparities between the interest caps applicable to particular bank
loans result primarily from differences in the state laws that impose
these caps.”173 In other words, the fact that some states have low
interest rate caps which allow rent-a-bank schemes to function via the
exportation doctrine is not a problem for the OCC to solve.
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Following the release of the new “valid-when-made rule,” New
York, California, and Illinois sued the OCC to block
implementation.174 The states claimed that the rule violated the
Administrative Procedures Act, because of the OCC’s contrived legal
reasoning, that the OCC failed to follow procedure, and that the OCC
failed to adequately address concerns regarding the rule’s impact on
rent-a-bank schemes.175 Of particular note is the complaint’s allegation
that “[t]he OCC lacks the authority to issue the Rule because it does
not have jurisdiction over what non-banks may do and because it
cannot contravene previous court rulings that interest-rate
preemption does not extend to non-banks.”176
The OCC “vigorously defended” against claims of overreach,177
calling the suit’s assertions “meritless,” stating that it was acting
“squarely within its authority when it promulgated the rule”178 to
address the gaps within Section 85 of the National Bank Act. The OCC
also stated that the rule does not “authorize the transfer of preemptive
powers to nonbanks” and that the rule was meant to clarify the scope
of authority that national banks already have under the law.179
For now, it looks like the rule is staying in place. In February 2022
Judge Jeffrey S. White of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted summary judgement for the OCC.180
Finding that Section 85 of the National Bank Act “does not speak
directly” to the issue of “what happens to the interest rate initially set
on a loan originated by a national bank if that loan is subsequently
transferred,”181 the court held that the OCC enacted the rule under a
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permissible construction of the statute, when, inter alia, the OCC is
charged with “[assuring] the safety and soundness of national
banks.”182 The court held that the rule did not extend the national
bank power to set certain interest rates to non-banks, but rather
allowed a national bank to assign a loan without “altering the interest
rate upon which it and the borrower initially agreed,” a power
“commensurate with [their] power to transfer or assign loans.”183 The
court also determined that the rule was neither arbitrary nor
capricious.184
After the opinion was released, commentors stated that the
holding was a “big win for the bank model,”185 but cautioned that the
war was not over.186 In February 2022 an appeal was expected,187 but
the state attorneys general did not continue their challenge. In
response to the case’s outcome, Acting Comptroller Hsu issued a terse
press release, stating that the “legal certainty [resulting from the case’s
holding] should be used to the benefit of consumers and not be
abused.”188 It remains unclear whether the OCC will change its
position on the rule, especially given the new Democratic presidential
administration.189 For now though, notably, true lender challenges
remain viable.190
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2. The FDIC’s Valid-When-Made Rule
Following the OCC, the FDIC voted three-to-one in June 2020 to
issue a new rule to clarify that interest rates associated with loans
originated at state-chartered banks continue to be enforceable after
assignment.191 At the time, the Chair of the FDIC stated that Madden
compelled the FDIC to issue the rule because it called into question
“longstanding principles” and that the new rule codified the “so-called
‘valid when made doctrine.’”192 The new rule stated that “whether
interest on a loan is permissible under section 27 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act is determined at the time the loan is made” and
that “interest on a loan permissible under section 27 is not affected by
a change in State law, a change in the relevant commercial paper rate,
or the sale, assignment, or other transfer of the loan.”193
The reasoning in the rule issuance parallels many of the
statements made by the OCC: the implicit right of banks to assign loans
under federal preemptive authority, the importance of eliminating
ambiguity caused by silence in the governing act, and the increased
risk caused by Madden to banks that might need to assign their loans
to increase liquidity during a financial crisis.194 In reviewing the rule,
a former chief counsel at the OCC stated that the wording of the FDIC
rule is substantially similar to the wording in the OCC’s final rule, that
there should be no difference in outcome, and that “banks should
react very positively to this development.”195 Notably, twenty-one state
attorneys general urged the FDIC not to adopt the rule.196
Similar to the dynamic at play concerning the OCC valid-whenmade-rule, those for and against the rule took varied approaches to
analyzing the impact of the continued codification of the traditional
valid-when-made doctrine. Lauren Saunders, Associate Director of the
National Consumer Law Center, stated that “[i]t’s deeply disturbing
that the FDIC and OCC are encouraging high-cost lending rather than
working to protect people, especially low-income families and people
of color who are being hit the hardest during the COVID-19 crisis.”197
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Also concerned with the nation’s economic recovery, the former OCC
Comptroller stated that “one effect of this rule is to make more credit
available to more people, which is an important fact in the recovery
from the response to COVID-19, which has made credit availability and
capital more important than ever.”198 Both parties agree that
consumer access to credit is important but disagree on how to balance
fluidity in the lending sector with adequate consumer protections, i.e.,
the subject of this Comment.
Following the adoption of the FDIC’s valid-when-made rule, the
attorneys general of California, Washington D.C., Illinois,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and North Carolina
brought an action to stop the rule’s implementation.199 Paralleling the
argument in the complaint filed against the OCC, the plaintiffs alleged
that the rule extends federal preemption to non-bank entities via
assignment, which “is beyond the FDIC’s power [], is contrary to
statute, and would facilitate predatory lending through ‘rent-a-bank’
partnerships designed to evade state law.”200 The complaint also
alleged that the FDIC failed to follow mandated procedures in issuance
of the rule, ignored evidence of the potential for regulatory evasion,
and did not explain the “rejection of evidence contrary to its
proposal.”201
The FDIC challenged the plaintiffs’ assertions, stating that the
plaintiffs misconstrued the rule and that the rule does “‘not regulate
nonbanks, does not interpret state law, and does not preempt state
law.’”202 The FDIC emphasized that “[g]iven the interconnected
nature of transactions and markets, the Supreme Court made clear
that a regulation directed at market participants within the agency’s
authority does not overstep the agency’s authority simply because it has
substantial effects on market participants outside the agency’s
authority” and that indirect effects of a new rule on nonbanks does not
equate to the agency acting outside the scope of its authority.203 The
FDIC also believed that the rule followed legal and historical
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precedents and promoted “healthy, orderly functioning of state
banks.”204
Like the OCC, the FDIC’s valid-when-made rule survived the
attorneys general attack in the Northern District of California.205
Paralleling the reasoning of the OCC opinion, the court granted
summary judgment in favor of the FDIC in February 2022.206 The court
held that there was no direct statutory language regarding a FDICinsured bank’s ability to assign a lending contract’s interest rate to a
non-bank when 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) is modeled on Section 85 of the
National Bank Act (the law that governs national banks and the OCC
on this issue),207 that the FDIC subsequently had the power to interpret
the governing statute to promulgate such a rule,208 and that the new
rule was not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.209 Like the OCC case, the state attorneys general did not take
an appeal, but the fog of politics equally clouds the future of the
FDIC’s version of the valid-when-made rule as the OCC’s.210
B. True Lender Rule
In response to courts’ increasing use of the true lender test, and
calls for regulators to adopt a new rule clarifying the assignability of
interest rates,211 the OCC adopted a final true lender rule in October
2020.212 The Rule stated that a national bank makes a loan if “as of the
date of origination, it [1] is named as the lender in the loan agreement
or [2] funds the loan.”213 Between the proposal and adoption of the
final rule, the OCC clarified that “when a loan is funded by one bank
but has documentation naming another bank as its lender, the latter
bank named in the loan agreement qualifies as the true lender.”214
According to the OCC, the new rule “would enable banks to fully
exercise the lending authority granted to them under Federal law and
204
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allow stakeholders to reliably and consistently identify key aspects of
the legal framework applicable to a loan.”215 In issuing the final rule,
the OCC decided not to follow commentor recommendations to
include a predominant economic interest prong, or other consumer
safeguards, stating that the rule did not depart from the bureau’s
supposed “longstanding and unwavering opposition to predatory
lending.”216
On its face, the OCC’s true lender rule directly conflicts with the
true lender tests developed by legislatures and courts detailed in Part
III of this Comment. The new rule declared that the true lender of a
loan, whatever the process of arrangement or bearing of risk, is a
national bank if a national bank is named on the loan. By favoring
form over function, the rule was criticized as “too lax [in that it] would
give unjustifiable and inexplicable cover to predatory nonbank lenders
that rely on sham lending partnerships with banks.”217 Although
industry groups were “generally supportive” of the rule, they also
expressed reservations with the rule as written, emphasizing that it
might affect mortgage warehouse lending or indirect auto financing.218
Unsurprisingly, state attorneys general immediately challenged
the new true lender rule. Bringing suit in January 2021, the coalition
of state attorneys general was more expansive than those who sued to
block the valid-when-made rules and included New York, California,
Colorado, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Jersey, and North Carolina.219 The plaintiffs sought to block the
“unprecedented and ill-conceived” rule, claiming that “the OCC
exceeded its statutory authority by offering an unreasonable
interpretation of federal law, and acted in a manner contrary to
centuries of case law, the OCC’s own prior interpretation of the law,
and the plain statutory language of the federal statutes it purports to
interpret.”220 The suit also claimed that the rule sought to preempt

215

Rosenstein, supra note 131.
Hill, supra note 6.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Complaint at 1, New York v. Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 1:21Civ.-00057 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2021). The case was dismissed by stipulation after Congress
and President Biden revoked the rule as discussed infra in the text accompanying notes
222–227. See Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice, New York v. Off.
of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 1:21-Civ.-00057 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2021).
220
Jon Hill, State AGs Sue To Block OCC’s ‘True Lender’ Rule, LAW360 (Jan. 5, 2021,
12:58 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1341787.
216

600

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:569

state usury law, infringed on the state police power, and facilitated
predatory lending.221
Congressional Democrats, recognizing the dangers posed by the
new true lender rule, decided to intervene and proposed two
companion resolutions in March 2021 to quash the rule via the
Congressional Review Act (CRA).222 The CRA gives Congress the
ability to repeal late rulemaking of an outgoing presidential
administration by passing resolutions in the House of Representatives
and Senate—by a simple majority—and attaining the sitting
president’s signature.223 Notably, once a rule is struck down via the
CRA, agencies cannot issue a new rule that is “substantially the
same.”224 Accordingly, CRA resolutions are considered more as a
“sledgehammer” than a “scalpel” because legislators cannot edit the
rule, only forbid the targeted rule’s continuance.225 After the
resolution to end the true lender rule passed through Congress with
limited bi-partisan support,226 President Biden wielded the
sledgehammer and approved the joint resolution in June 2021.227
Since the CRA quashed the OCC’s true lender rule, uncertainty
remains regarding the enforceability of loans subject to true lender
tests.
Although the OCC’s defense of the two-factor test
unsatisfactorily addressed the rule’s ability to facilitate high-interest
lending, clarity is still warranted regarding the enforceability of
interest rates after assignment for loans originated at national banks.
Assignors and assignees in the secondary lending market should clearly
understand what deals they are making and the enforceability of the
contracts they are purchasing and selling. A consistent federal rule
would help.
If the OCC were to issue a new rule though, per the CRA’s
requirements, it cannot be substantially the same as the old rule. This
statutory mandate raises questions regarding what shape a new true
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lender rule would take. When this issue was raised with Lauren
Saunders at the National Consumer Law Center, she was confident
that the bar would not be difficult to meet if a new rule is crafted in
such a way that it “actually protects consumers.”228 In response to
questions of if and when the agency will issue a new rule, Acting
Comptroller Hsu said that the OCC is analyzing data to figure out “how
[the OCC] can define and differentiate between harmful rent-acharter arrangements and healthy partnerships that expand access to
credit.”229
In September 2021 it looked like there would be some progress
on this front when President Biden nominated Saule Omarova as the
next Comptroller of the OCC.230 The administration’s previous delay
in nominating a Comptroller had been an issue for both Congressional
Democrats and Republicans231 and likely contributed to the agency’s
limited action regarding a new true lender rule. But in December
Moderate
2021, Saule Omarova, withdrew her nomination.232
Democrats failed to back her nomination while bank lobbyists and
congressional Republicans vehemently opposed the appointment,
even going so far as to imply that Omarova was a communist because
of her national origin.233 Given the policy differences between the
Trump and Biden administrations and the current level of political
partisanship, future leadership at the OCC is unclear, as is the
development of a new true lender rule.
As discussed below, a reasonable true lender rule—a rule that
balances consumer protections with legal certainty regarding the
enforceability of a lending contract—remains necessary to increase
stability in the sector. The implementation of a highly problematic,
eleventh-hour rule and its immediate repeal by the following
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administration does not increase stability,234 nor does the unjustified
politicization of the Comptroller.
V. A NATIONWIDE INTEREST RATE CAP AND THE CONTINUED
IMPORTANCE OF TRUE LENDER AND VALID-WHEN-MADE RULES
Debate, implementation, legal challenges, and congressional
action regarding the true lender and valid-when-made rules take place
in a dual banking system that conspicuously lacks a nationwide
consumer interest rate cap. The absence of a nationwide interest rate
cap is a significant contributor to current discord over the true lender
and valid-when-made rules. The lack of a nationwide interest rate cap
motivates states to implement usury limits to protect consumers, which
leads lenders to take advantage of federal preemption via the
exportation doctrine, which leads state legislatures and courts to
implement a predominant economic interest test or curtail the scope
of the valid-when-made doctrine, which results in the OCC and FDIC
issuing new rules when uncertainty associated with the assignment of
lending contracts destabilizes the market.
If the federal government were to implement a nationwide
consumer interest rate cap, is the debate over the valid-when-made and
true lender rules moot? Not quite. Even if a nationwide interest rate
cap were extended to cover all consumer loans, solidified guidance
from the OCC and FDIC regarding the true lender test and valid-whenmade doctrine remains necessary to better stabilize the lending sector,
especially when, as discussed below, lenders might increasingly rely on
federal preemption to shore up the loss of profitability of other, now
illegal, loans.
A. Veterans and Consumers Fair Credit Act (VCFCA)
For many years, consumer advocates and legal commentors have
been calling for the federal government to implement a nationwide
interest rate cap when lenders are able to use the exportation doctrine
234
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to avoid state consumer protections.235 Although many states have
mustered the political will to limit interest rates,236 the federal
government has largely failed to do so, excluding the few exceptions
discussed below. This has led some commentators to propose
solutions that strengthen state law to further prohibit non-bank
entities from entering into rent-a-bank and rent-a-tribe
arrangements;237 however, state-based solutions perpetuate the
patchwork problem that industry members lament,238 and given the
recent OCC and FDIC rule developments, these solutions seem less
viable in protecting consumers.
Further, of contemporary importance for the whole sector is the
Veterans and Consumers Fair Credit Act (VCFCA), a federal bill which
proposes a nationwide consumer loan annual interest rate cap of
36%.239 Consumer advocates consider the 36% interest rate cap to be
the “dividing line” between safe, affordable loans that allow consumers
to access sufficient credit and debt traps that encourage borrowers to
enter into new loans to pay off the old.240
1. The Goal of the VCFCA
First introduced in November 2019,241 and again in July 2021,242
the VCFCA would institute a 36% annual interest rate cap on
consumer loans,243 with carveouts for mortgages; loans to finance a
vehicle where the vehicle serves as collateral; and loans made by
federal credit unions that are already subject to the interest rates caps
of the Federal Credit Union Act.244 The VCFCA extends interest rate
protections present in the Military Lending Act (MLA), which
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currently covers active-duty military members and their dependents,245
to all consumers by amending Chapter 2 of the Truth in Lending
Act.246
Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown, Chairman of the Senate
Banking Committee, stated the goal of the legislation is to “cut off
access to loans at interest rates so high they ruin people’s lives.”247
Ashley Harrington, the Federal Advocacy Director and Senior Counsel
at the Center for Responsible Lending, has said that predatory lenders
are continually seeking loopholes to federal and state laws meant to
prevent abusive lending practices and that the VCFCA “is the most
effective way of ending the debt trap.”248 Harrington’s statement
echoes other commentors who have characterized state regulations
and lenders’ endeavors to avoid usury law as a “complex game of
whack-a-mole,”249 and that the time for states to maintain their
traditional purview over usury has come and gone.250
While consumer advocates argue in favor of the law, some trade
groups such as the American Financial Services Association and the
Consumer Bankers Association have put forth concerns regarding the
viability of the bill’s more expansive definition of Annual Percentage
Rate (APR), labeling it an “all-in” APR, because it includes certain fees
and charges not traditionally considered part of a loan’s interest
rate.251 In particular, industry groups worried that the bill would limit
the availability of rewards credit cards when the cards charge
additional fees that would count toward the card’s APR.252 Other
critics of the VCFCA have questioned if it is appropriate to extend the
lending limitations of the Military Lending Act beyond “a small
segment of the population” to all Americans, based on what they see
as unsubstantiated data underlying the Department of Defense’s
(DoD) statement that the MLA is “working as intended.”253 Because
the MLA serves as the foundation of the VCFCA, including the
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provision of many of the bill’s key terms and definitions,254 the MLA
warrants some discussion.
2. VCFCA Relationship to the MLA
In 2007 Congress passed the MLA to protect active-duty military
members and their families from entering predatory lending
relationships.255 At the time, military leaders were troubled by the
effect of abusive lending practices on military members, compromising
the nation’s “military readiness.”256 A year prior to the MLA’s passage,
the DoD issued a report detailing that one-sided lending practices,
such as payday lending, were “harm[ing] the morale of troops and
their families, and add[ing] to the cost of fielding an all-volunteer
fighting force.”257 Lenders were taking advantage of military members
that lacked sophistication in financial matters, concentrating business
near military bases,258 and even using military-sounding names in
marketing, such as “military loans,” in order to take advantage of
affinity.259 The 2006 report found that “payday lenders, which charged
annual percentage rates ranging from 390 to 780 percent, were
significantly more likely to be located in areas adjacent to military
installations than other areas of similar population.”260 Following
many of the recommendations made by the DoD, Congress passed the
MLA and directed the DoD to prescribe and implement lending
regulations by October 2007.261
Responding to lenders taking advantage of loopholes in the MLA
via a narrow definition of consumer credit, the DoD modified the bill’s
regulations to include transactions where “‘credit [is] offered to a
covered borrower for personal, family, or household purposes’ that is
either ‘subject to a finance charge’ or ‘payable by a written agreement
in more than four installments.’”262 The modified definition of
consumer credit is consistent with the Truth in Lending Act and
extends to all forms of consumer credit, other than those explicitly
excluded: “residential mortgages and other mortgage-secured credit”;
254
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credit to finance a motor vehicle, secured by the motor vehicle; or
credit intended to finance other personal property, “secured by the
personal property being purchased.”263
In addition to having an expansive definition regarding the forms
of lending covered by the MLA, the DoD drafted the definition of
“interest” in such a way as to prevent lenders from shifting interest to
other fees so as to circumvent the limit.264 For the MLA, the maximum
military annual percentage rate (MAPR) includes:
(1) [p]remiums of fees for credit insurance, debt cancellation, or debt suspension products[;] (2) [f]ees for credit-related ancillary products sold with the credit transaction[;]
(3) [f]inance charges as defined by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau in 12 CFR 1026, known as “Regulation
Z[;]” [and] (4) [a]ny application or participation fee, except
an application fee charged by a federal credit union or insured depository institution for a short-term, small loan once
in any 12 month period.265
Exclusions to the MAPR include a “bona fide credit card fee that does
not exceed the average amount of similar charges by large U.S. credit
card issuers,” such as foreign transaction or cash advance fees, and
“application fee[s] for a short-term, small loan made by a federal credit
union or insured depository institution once in any 12-month period.”
266
Like the MLA, the VCFCA does exclude some bona fide credit card
fees, other than a periodic rate, from counting toward a loan’s interest
rate limit.267
In response to a request by the House of Representatives, the DoD
released a report in May 2021 that considers the impact of a MAPR
lower than 30%.268 Although much of the report focuses on the
potential impact of a 30% interest rate cap on active-duty military
members and their dependents, discussion of the impact of the extant
36% cap sheds light on the potential effects of the VCFCA on
consumers’ ability to access credit writ large. In the report, the DoD
stated that it “believes the MLA is currently working as intended and
that Service members continue to have ample access to necessary
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credit.”269 Since Congress enacted the MLA, DoD financial educators
and military aid societies are reporting fewer instances of active duty
members seeking assistance after entering into predatory lending
arrangements.270 And to date, “the [DoD] has no indication that
Service members and their families lack adequate access to necessary,
responsible credit.”271 It is undetermined how dependent these
conclusions are on the regulations themselves, or the regulations
combined with the DoD’s financial literacy efforts, inter alia, but the
results appear promising regarding the continued availability of
consumer credit opportunities if Congress were to enact a 36%
nationwide consumer interest rate cap.
Critics of the extension of the MLA model to all consumers via
the VCFCA found the DoD’s evaluative statements regarding service
members’ continued access to credit after the passage of the MLA to
be conclusory.272 These critiques seem a bit disingenuous given that
they dismiss further findings of the same report that indicate that an
interest rate cap of 30% would have limited effect on the MLA’s class
of consumers’ ability to access credit.273 The DoD stated that many
lenders already offer credit opportunities below 30%, that nearly one
quarter of active-duty members are already stationed in states that
enforce interest rate caps of 30% or below, and that federal credit
unions are already limited to a 28% cap on small loans under National
Credit Union Administration regulations.274 Regarding credit cards,
the DoD determined that a rate cap “as low as 28 percent would likely
have no impact on Service members’ access,” with the caveat that
“credit card issuers meet exemptions for eligible bona fide fees when
calculating the MAPR.”275 Although consumer advocates would find
these results promising, the Department took no official stance on
lowering the MAPR from 36% to 30%.276
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The future of the VCFCA is uncertain, but it warrants attention
that a 36% interest rate cap appears to have broad bi-partisan support
from the voting public. According to a 2020 poll conducted by
Morning Consult on behalf of the Center for Responsible Lending, 70
percent of voters support an annual interest rate cap of 36% on payday
and consumer installment loans.277 Of the 30 percent that oppose the
36% interest rate cap, three out of five do so on the ground that the
cap should be even lower.278
B. VCFCA and State Law Consumer Protections
Although a federal 36% annual interest rate cap on consumer
loans would significantly curtail high-interest lending, the VCFCA
allows states to maintain their consumer law protections if they are
more stringent than the national standard. The VCFCA states that
“[n]othing in this section may be construed to preempt any provision
of State law that provides greater protection to consumers than is
provided under this section.”279 The “greater protection” language
indicates that states are free to impose additional restrictions on
lenders beyond the 36% cap.
This term is key for states such as New Jersey, Oklahoma,
Vermont, Arkansas, and California that have a 30%, or lower, annual
interest rate limit (including fees) on a closed-end $2,000 two-year
loan.280 The state median interest rate for such loans is 32%281 and the
state median interest rate for a similar $500 six-month loan is 38.5%,
with twenty-one more states having a cap at 36% or below.282
If Congress passed the VCFCA, it is unclear if states would alter
the interest rate caps they have on the books, especially when one
considers that the extant limits are what the elected officials in those
jurisdictions considered to be an appropriate consumer protection.
Where state laws are not changed, and the VCFCA allows state usury
limits to stay on the books, lenders will likely exploit a potential gap in
277
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consumer protections through the continued use of federal
preemption and the exportation doctrine—extending loans that are
below the 36% cap, but above the rate a specific state would permit.
Grounding this assessment is a presumption that lenders will, if the
market permits, charge the maximum allowable rate to consumers by
law. In 2009 a study on payday lending showed “a strong relationship
between actual payday loan prices and the payday loan price ceiling
imposed by [state usury laws].”283 That is, payday lenders frequently
charge interest rates based on the legality of the rate, not the
consumers’ creditworthiness.284
Lenders exploiting the gap, the continuation of the true lender
test, and uncertainty regarding the future of the extant valid-whenmade rules leaves the lending sector with quite a bit of the same legal
uncertainty that previously existed. Notably though, if the VCFCA
were to pass, some of the secondary market risk caused by the legal
uncertainty would be more limited than it is now, because at the most,
the enforceable interest rate is 36%, rather than potentially the tripledigit rates highlighted in Part III. With a reasonable and consistent
nationwide interest rate cap, presidential administrations, courts, and
legislatures might also be less willing to revive Madden or expand the
application of the true lender test to combat the abuses of high-interest
lending when the underlying loans themselves are less exploitative.
For the greatest level of legal and market stability, however, a
nationwide interest rate cap and solidified true lender and valid-whenmade rules remain necessary, providing adequate security to lenders
regarding the enforceability of interest rates of loans they originate
and later assign. As evidenced by critiques to the true lender rule and
Madden, lenders want to extend credit where there is certainty
regarding their ability to later assign the loan. Legal certainty supports
lenders as they search for parties to purchase the loans, which allows
banks to shift the loans, and their risk, off balance sheets. This process
minimizes the banks’ exposure, permitting the banks to offer
additional credit opportunities to other consumers, which further
facilitates economic development.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Consumer lending in the United States has a complex history that
illustrates the importance of balancing access to credit with regulations
that ensure lending is on fair terms. Fostering a dual banking system,
the federal government has had a significant impact on a traditional
realm of state policymaking: what constitutes an acceptable interest
rate. Federal law, judicial interpretations of the valid-when-made
doctrine and Section 85 of the National Bank Act, technological
developments, and larger market forces have all contributed to the
growth of an abusive high-interest consumer lending sector. Via the
application of the true lender test and limiting the valid-when-made
doctrine, state legislatures and courts have responded, challenging the
validity of lending arrangements that utilize the exportation doctrine
and federal preemption to circumvent state usury limits. When courts
utilize the true lender test or limit the valid-when-made doctrine, legal
uncertainty arises regarding the enforceability of loans that depend on
the exportation doctrine to charge higher interest rates.
Uncertainty regarding the enforceability of an interest rate, and
potentially the entire loan, limits lenders’ ability to find willing
purchasers in secondary markets. When purchasers are scarcer,
fluidity in the lending sector lessens, stifling other consumers’ ability
to access credit, which, in extreme circumstances, can impact bank
liquidity and imperil larger economic growth. The valid-when-made
and true lender rules recently issued by the FDIC and OCC were meant
to serve as a full course correction, but they have failed to achieve that
end, and instead have potentially eroded some of the few remaining
protections for consumers against high-interest loans. Concurrently,
in the interest of balancing consumer protections with access to credit,
legislators have proposed the Veterans and Consumers Fair Credit Act
which includes a nationwide 36% annual interest rate cap. This cap
has the potential to resolve some sector instability when the legal
volatility of usurious high-interest consumer loans is more constrained
and when courts and presidential administrations become less willing
to intervene and apply the true lender test or revive Madden to protect
consumers. The VCFCA, however, is not a cure-all.
If Congress passed the VCFCA, lenders will likely, if possible,
continue to charge consumers the highest legally permissible interest
rates. Depending on the state, consumers have a gap in coverage
between state-mandated interest rate limits and the federal 36% cap, a
gap that can be exploited through the exportation doctrine. Were the
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VCFCA to pass, utilization of the exportation doctrine would likely
expand when lenders’ profits are constrained to a more limited range,
amplifying the need to charge a greater swath of borrowers the highest
interest rates permissible. Also, with a more limited profit range,
lenders might become more aggressive in extending credit, increasing
default risk. With a greater proportion of consumer loans relying on
federal preemption, a greater proportion of loans are subject to
potential invalidation via the application of the true lender test, or a
modified rule which follows Madden. The dual-factor risk of increased
legal uncertainty and heightened default potential will slow the fluid
assignment of loans into secondary markets.
Even if the
unenforceability risk is mitigated by courts and state legislatures
becoming less willing to intervene to void or limit abusively-high
interest rates, a greater proportion of loans would nevertheless be
relying on federal preemption—loans which might attract stricter
scrutiny when a larger pool of borrowers default. Accordingly, with
the passage of a national consumer loan interest rate limit, the need
for solidified true lender and valid-when-made rules becomes even
more acute. Solidified rules would enable banks and secondarymarket assignees to have sufficient legal certainty regarding the
enforceability of their lending contracts, thus increasing the fluid
assignment of loans, freeing lenders of risk on their balance sheets,
resulting in the greater availability of credit for other consumers.

